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uage of the statute immediately suggests that certain character or character trait of a person is made a criminal offense. This is borne out by People v. Craig iv. 'Craig (1907), (152 C 42, 91 P997), involving resistance to an arrest which was declared to be lawful because the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the police officer. The only thing "committed" in the offi cer's presence was the arresting officer's knowledge that the defend. ant had frequented saloons and rented out premises for a house of prostitution-not at the time of arrest but within three months before the arrest.
From there the court went on to say: "And it makes no difference that this species of vagrancy cannot be committed by a single act ob servable at one point of time. A series of acts extending over a considerable period of time and only constituting a criminal offense be cause of their continuance and repetition."¡
It is obvious then that the offend.
ing character constitutes the crime;,
in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The court stated: "Plainly the Supreme Court's conclusion (referring to the Craig case) that one is guilty of being a vagrant at any time or place where he is found, so long as the character remains unchanged,, although then and there innocent of any act demonstrating this charac ter." This interpretation makes it.
but that the character has to be clear that the lewd character of a
proved by a series of acts. ., '
In People v. Scott (1931) (113 C. A. 778, 296 P. 601), inroads were made on the requirement of a multiplicity of acts to prove the character of the defendant. The case involved a woman dancing in the nude at a men's smoker and the court stated after a discussion of the Craig case:, "There are however other acts which are of such nature as reasonably to justify an inference that no one not of lewd or dissolute character would do such an act even once." The final logical sequence was reached in People v. Lund (1934). (137 C. A. 781, 27 P. 2n 958). In this case the defend. ant had not committed any act with
person is the only corpus delicti required by the section without any concern to specific acts. The Human Character as a Crime
This would seem contrary to the well established principle-not only in this country but in all Western jurisprudence that only a voluntary act of commission or omission can be the basis of a criminal offense. Section 15 of the California Penal Code defines a public offense is "an act committéed or omitted in viofation of a law forbidding or commanding it.". Clearly the statement that the "act" of being idle, lewd or dissolute constitutes the offense has no validity, because this is not an act in the common usage of the word
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is a prolific source of crime, still 'it is not competent for the legislature to denounce mere inaction as a crime without some qualification." While a mere dictum in that case, it was reluctantly distinguished and thereby recognized in Re Cutler (1934), (1 ̊C. A. 2d. 273, 36 P. 441). In the same manner it can hardly be conceived how it would be competent for the legislature to embark on the enterprise of seleqing associates for the citizens of this State. In Ex Parte Smith (135 Mo 223, 33 down a mere definitive statute claimL. R. A. 606), the court struck
nor is it always voluntary. It involves character which at least, in part is molded by environmental factors completely outside the volition of the individual. To make a distinction between character and status in this case would be only a play with words since the section does not refer to relationships with other people or outside objects. If the endowment with a certain charactef or person. ality is the object of the crime and specific acts have lost even their secondary importance of evidencing this type of character or personality, then any distinction between nou. criminal opinion, behavior devia ing it to be as "unjust and unreason. tion and criminal disloyalty is ob able for a legislative body to undertake to forbid certain (associates as literated. There is nothing to prevent the prosecution of a person for to command with whom one should holding unpopular beliefs as long associate." People v., Belcastro as such beliefs in somebody's opin (1934), ( 356 III. 144, 190 N. E. ion make the person lewd and dis301), followed the same reasoning. solute. It would seem however that. If this part of the section is to reto punish a person for having a main on the statute book, guilt by association would become a fully certain character is not a proper objective of legislative endeavor and accepted legal principle. that any such statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Conduct as to the Offense Another objection to the lewd vagrancy statute, based on a different aspect of the Due Process Clause, is that the cited section is too vague and indefinite. for equal and nondiscriminatory enforcement. Little would therefore be gained from a different interpretation or amend, ment of the section to the effect that idle, lewd or dissolute conduct is required by the section. Only brief comment will be given to the first part of this subsection "idle" and last part Associate of known thieves." In Re McCue (1908), (7 C. A. 765, 96 P. 893), the court stated: "We are inclined to view that while idleness, whether it be that of the "idle rich" or "idle poor"
Lewdness and Dissoluteness This then brings us to a discussion of the terms "lewd" and "dissolute," the piece de resistence of the section. Re McCue, supra, interprets the terms as follows: lewdness and dissoluteness-terms used interchangeably, but each of which applies to the unlawful indulgence of lust whether in public or private." The court then cites Ex Parte Tuttle, (91 C 590, 127 P. 934), for a definition of unlawful lust: "Any practice the tendency of which, as shown by experience, is to weaken or corrupt the morals, of those who follow it." The definition is thereby reduced to the tautology: lewd is what is against the morals. The dictionary definition's of the terms as lascivious, licentious and libidinous are not of much help either.
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